Abstract. In this article, we use annual county-level manufacturing plant location data for New York State to examine the effects of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments on the location decisions of new pollution-intensive manufacturing plants in the "neo-regulatory" (1980-84) and "mature-regulatory" (1985-90) phases of the Act's implementation. Our results suggest that the temporal effects of regulation vary. Whereas the location decisions of pollution intensive manufacturing firms were unaffected by the Act's regulatory restrictions in the "neo-regulatory" period, the restrictions appear to have had a significant negative impact on the location decisions of these types of firms in the Act's "mature-regulatory" phase. The diversion of new pollution intensive plants to counties with less stringent environmental regulations suggests that current US environmental regulations may be leading to a "browning process" whereby counties historically free of pollution become havens for polluters.
Introduction
The impact of interjurisdictional competition on the structure of social regulations has sparked a controversial debate among academics, legislators, and the We thank participants at the conference for Environmental Policy and Competitiveness in Schiermonnikoog, The Netherlands and the Southern Regional Science Association in Savannah, Georgia for useful suggestions. Seminar participants at the University of Arizona and the University of Wyoming also provided candid remarks. Vernon Henderson, Henk Folmer, Maureen Kilkenny, and two anonymous reviewers provided helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Leslie Papke provided invaluable assistance by supplying her Gauss estimation procedure. All errors remain our own. general public. Within this broad set of agendas, a growing interest in the effects of interjurisdictional competition on the basis of environmental regulations has recently developed. On the theoretical side, the bulk of the literature suggests that interjurisdictional competition will induce local regulators to "race to the bottom" and set suboptimal environmental standards to attract mobile capital (see e.g., Cumberland 1981; Markusen et al. 1995) .
Although most theoretical models, as well as many national and local policy makers, assume the trade-off is clear, recent empirical evidence implies that stringency of environmental regulations is only weakly (or not at all) associated with the level of manufacturing activity (Bartik 1988; McConnell and Schwab 1990; Duffy-Deno 1992; Garafolo and Malhotra 1995; Levinson 1996b) .
1 If these empirical findings do indeed represent reality, it is difficult to understand why so many state and local policy makers continue to provide tax relief and other financial incentives to help defray the costs of manufacturers' compliance with pollution control regulations.
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While it would be easy to dismiss policy makers' actions as irrational or self-serving behavior designed to garner attention and political support, the possibility that previous empirical research may have failed to address the problem at hand must be considered. We believe there are three interrelated empirical shortcomings that cast doubt on the previous empirical findings. First, due to data constraints, most location studies use aggregate manufacturing data. This is likely to lead to false inference -while the effects of environmental regulation may be minimal at the aggregate level, some industries, especially those that are heavy polluters or geographically mobile, may be significantly affected by stringent pollution control policies.
3 Second, the empirical model used by many researchers is cross-sectional and therefore does not control for the simultaneous nature of firm location and pollution problems. Since the location of industry, higher pollution levels, and subsequently more stringent pollution standards are positively correlated cross-sectionally, regression models that do not account for this phenomenon potentially yield inaccurate coefficient estimates. 4 In a related vein, a cross-sectional estimation procedure fails to address adequately the issue at hand. For example, analyzing the difference between new firm births in region i at time t and new firm births in region i at time t + φ, as a function of the difference in region i 's environmental regulations over this same time period is
